The Core of Bayesian Persuasion
An analyst observes the frequency with which an agent takes actions, but not the frequency with which she takes actions conditional on a payoff relevant state. In this setting, we ask when the analyst can rationalize the agent’s choices as the outcome of the agent learning something about the state before taking action. Our characterization marries the obedience approach in information design (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) and the belief approach in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) relying on a theorem by Strassen (1965) and Hall’s marriage theorem. We apply our results to ring-network games and to identify conditions under which a data set is consistent with a public information structure in first-order Bayesian persuasion games.
Date: 31 May 2024, 14:15 (Friday, 6th week, Trinity 2024)
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room G or
Speaker: Laura Doval (Columbia GSB)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Edward Clark