Coordination and Network Structures in the Presence of Surveillance
This paper studies the choice of network structures by criminal organizations in the presence of surveillance. A group of symmetric agents chooses a network structure and trades off better coordination, through centralized networks, with less exposure to the detection of its members, through decentralization. Bad surveillance technologies lead to smaller negative externalities between members which makes complete networks optimal. Improvements in surveillance lead to more decentralization, either through a split within the network or through more hierarchical structures. The type of decentralization depends on the value of indirect communication within the network.
Date: 7 February 2023, 12:45 (Tuesday, 4th week, Hilary 2023)
Venue: Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details: Butler Room, D Staircase or
Speaker: Alae Baha (University of Oxford)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Emma Heritage